Our second week in Bolivia has been both uneventful (in general) & somewhat cautious (Javi has a stomach problem). My research is still moving forward at a decent pace. I’ve almost finished the section on legislative careers (coding all of the members of Chamber of Deputy commissions from 1985-2009).

I’ve spent the better part of a week on my research in Bolivia. One of the odd things about this, of course, is that in a whirlwind trip I have limited time to pay attention to “current event” news in detail. Sure, there’s the kind of soaking & poking that happens (including reading interesting graffiti everywhere), but that never really makes up for careful, thorough analysis of facts (as opposed to knee-jerk reactions based on ideological prejudices). But balancing time between spending hours tucked away in the Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional & entertaining w/ Javi (my 18-month-old) limits that kind of thorough “on the scene” analysis. Still, there were a few interesting moments.

We arrived in La Paz Monday afternoon, a bit tired after a long bus trip from Cochabamba, and feeling the effects of altitude (Javi, not so much). We´re settled into our cozy little habitación in Casa Hermanos Manchego (though sans the promised wifi). There are changes in La Paz, but so far the city seems oddly "depoliticized" compared to previous visits, despite the frequent tv/radio government (and some opposition) spots. I´ll try to comment on some of the news later.

K8 posted some photos to her Facebook account, but I’ll wait to post photos until I’m in La Paz & have a bit more time. But Javi is having a grand time in Santa Cruz. The weather is cooperating nicely (not too hot, not too humid), even though many of the local attractions are closed for “winter” (it can get as low as the mid-70s here!).

Our first few days in Santa Cruz are mostly devoted to catching up w/ my parents & relatives, so I’ve not had a chance to really scour the Bolivian news. There will be much more of that when we get to La Paz, obviously. But the two main stories that seem to dominate everyone’s attention are swine flu (N1H1, here called A1H1) & deteriorating Bolivia-Peru relations.

We finally arrived in Bolivia after a long journey that started in Chicago on Saturday afternoon & ended in Santa Cruz on Sunday night (w/ a midnight to 7pm layover in Miami). Both flights were fine. And Bolivian immigration was actually rather easy (though it seemed hard at the end of a 30 hour trip). But once again American Airlines showed itself to lack any understanding of the words “customer service.”

Two days ago @arpiel posted a link to an interesting (and provocative) piece of independent journalism about USAID’s links to Bolivia’s anti-Evo opposition.

Yesterday I posted some (very) early predictions for Bolivia’s December 2009 elections. I decided to make up a table showing some possible vote distributions based on some possible scenarios.

I’m going to forgo a lot of the he/she speculation about a number of Bolivian topics swirling around the internets. But let me address those briefly, before turning to the upcoming December elections.

More details on the (alleged) terrorists/assassins captured/killed in Bolivia early this week: One of them, the Bolivian born Eduardo Rózsa, was what I’d call a “crazy.”

La Razón has reports of a capture of some foreign nationals who may have been involved in an assassination attempt on Evo Morales.

On Wednesday, Bolivia’s legislature passed the final version (en detalle) of the country’s new, “transitional” electoral law. There were a number of interesting compromises in the bill, which changed it not only from the original MAS proposal, but also from the version passed (en grande) a few days earlier in plenary session. Overall, the new law is an interesting compromise—and one that mostly benefits the opposition, not MAS.

Some details of the new electoral law (which still needs to be voted on en detalle; it was only passed en grande) have come out: The number of special/reserved indigenous seats is reduced to eight. Nearly 30% of the voter rolls will be revised between May-September (an opposition demand). Bolivians living abroad will be allowed to vote—and the CNE will provide funds for presidential campaigns to campaign in foreign countries for 10 days. Incumbents will not be required to resign three months prior to an election (this had been a bizarre Bolivian tradition).

I feel like I’ve been on the road for the past few weeks, which has limited my blogging time (though I’ve also shifted much of my online time to my Twitter posts). I’ve also wanted to postpone commenting on the Bolivian electoral law crisis (isn’t there always a “crisis” brewing these days?) until it was more or less resolved. It seems like it has been, for the time being: Bolivia’s parliament approved a last-minute transitional electoral law less than an hour ago (although it’s currently unclear if the law was passed “properly” and/or what the law contains).

MABB & I are presenting a paper at this weekend’s MPSA conference in Chicago. Our paper is titled “The Political Economy of Bolivia’s New Regionalism: A Look at Electoral Patterns in Santa Cruz, Tarija, and Chuquisaca” and uses municipal-level election, socioeconomic, and demographic (ethnicity) data to test the conventional wisdom explanation for regional autonomy movements in the Media Luna.

We found that differences in degrees of “ruralness,” poverty, and “indigeneity” across municipalities had no significant relationship (except in Chuquisaca) with support for Evo Morales, MAS, pro-autonomy prefect candidates, or regional autonomy. You can read our paper here; we appreciate any comments or feedback.

Every once in a while I get feedback of various sorts on my blog. Often, these fall into two camps: 1) why don’t I post more about Bolivia news? or 2) why do I let my biases keep me from reporting certain things? Oddly, I the second criticism comes from those who think I’m too anti-MAS and those who think I’m not critical enough of the MAS government.

Barrioflores already tweeted it, but El Deber published an Ipsos/AOM poll of likely presidential candidates for Bolivia’s December 2009 general election.

Over the weekend, a crowd of MAS supporters attacked the home of Bolivia’s former vice president & indigenous leader, Víctor Hugo Cárdenas. Cárdenas, then leader of MRTK, was vice president under Goni (1993-1997). At the time, MRTKL was the largest of the katarista parties—though it never won more than 2-3% of the national vote in any given election. Still, Cárdenas is often credited w/ putting Goni’s campaign “over the top,” as well as for initiating a new “multicultural” period of Bolivian politics.

I just got back from a short mini conference at American University on various issues involving multiculturalism in democracies.

Despite its fanfare, Bolivia’s new constitution (CPE) actually introduces only limited changes to the basic structure of Bolivia’s political system. Yes, the new CPE approved by voters a few weeks ago continues the tradition (since the 1994 CPE) of multiculturalism, participation, and decentralization. Here, however, I want to focus on the few minor changes to the legislature.

Because I was at a conference all weekend, I didn’t get to post about today’s proclamation of Bolivia’s new constitution (though I did Twitter about it). I’ll have more later, particularly as I’m interested in these issues: 1) the implications for a newly redesigned legislature on the electoral system; 2) the implications of the various new “autonomies” on state-local relations (and Bolivia’s new “federacy”); 3) the internal party re-alignments that will take place as political actors look to the December 2009 elections under the new constitution; and 4) how does Evo’s foreign policy now shift now that the major element of his domestic agenda (a new constitution) is taken care of.

For the past week, following voters’ approval of the new constitution (as well as the reduction of maximum land ownership from 10,000 to 5,000 hectares), members of Bolivia’s Landless Movement (MST, Movimiento Sin Tierra) began occupying lands throughout Bolivia, concentrated in Santa Cruz. Some of the occupied lands, however, were owned by the state hydrocarbons company (YPFB). The result has been increased tension as regional opposition leaders who criticize the government for giving MST “license” to seize lands, and MST leaders criticize Evo’s MAS government for not moving quickly enough to meet their demands. In the end, Evo has chosen to crack down on MST by ordering the arrest three of the group’s leaders, including Valerio Queso.

Queso may be vaguely familiar to many around the world. The man looks very much like Evo, and actually played the Bolivian president in a recent film biopic, Evo Pueblo.

If you’re looking to get your Bolivia news & updates fix, check out Red Bolivia. I’ve only glanced at it quickly, but so far it looks like it contains a great deal of information about Bolivia & global issues from a “Bolivian perspective.”

Sara Miller Llana (who recently interviewed me for a story on Bolivia’s constitutional referendum) has a story on Afro-Bolivians in today’s Christian Science Monitor.

Results from Bolivia’s constitutional referendum are available from the CNE, which is still counting votes. Both because they’re not finished counting, and because I’m “Mr. Mom” for the next two days, I’ll hold my analysis for at least a few more days. But so far it’s starting to look as if the pattern from the August 2008 recall referendums is repeating itself.

Official results will follow next week month. But quick counts show that the CPE was approved by 58.7% of the vote. The figure is lower than Evo had predicted (and lower than he won in the recent recall referendum), but still a substantial margin of victory.

Very early counts have started coming in as polls close across much of Bolivia. So far, it looks like the new constitution has 60-62% of valid votes according to the Unitel, PAT, and Red Uno networks. Those numbers might change, of course (up or down). But we should also look at turnout and blank/null votes and regional differences. As the numbers stand, they are lower than Evo predicted a few days ago. If turnout is low and/or if the blank/null votes are high and/or if some regions vote against the CPE by substantial margins, it could complicate things.

Voting is, of course, still ongoing in Bolivia’s constitutional referendum. If you’re interested in doing a simple side-by-side comparison of the current (2004) Constitución Política del Estado (CPE) & the document voters are being asked to vote on today, the National Electoral Court published both texts in a single volume.

The campaigns for Bolivia’s constitutional referendum on Sunday are winding down. Technically, all campaign activities are supposed to end today, as pre-election restrictions (e.g. no sale of alcohol at least 24 hours before polls open) start to come into play.

Just a quick note on some new political figures who are joining the “No” campaign in Bolivia’s upcoming constitutional referendum. Today’s La Razón reports that Carlos Mesa & Loyola Guzmán have joined the “No” campaign.

Bolivia’s constitutional referendum is Sunday, January 25. The referendum is, by now, only loosely based on the work of the Constituent Assembly elected in June 2006 or the actual draft text approved in December 2007 (in a meeting in Oruro, rather than Sucre, that excluded most members of the opposition). Throughout most of 2008, the country was in political turmoil. Late in October 2008, opposition & MAS legislators forged an agreement—which included a substantial rewrite of the draft constitution (CPE, for “Constitución Política del Estado”)—and set the stage for the upcoming referendum. Could 2009 offer a new beginning for Bolivia?

Forgive the temporary digest form, but a few interesting news bombshells today from Bolivia:

Lots of updates to come tomorrow, as I slowly get back into gear from the holiday break. First priority, of course: updates w/ pictures of Javi’s first Christmas & birthday in Chicago. Next, Bolivian politics—particularly as the constitutional referendum is now just around the corner.

Today’s La Razón, however, has an interesting report suggesting possible electoral fraud in the August recall referendum. I’ll look at that closely for tomorrow.

Back when José Luís Exeni was named to head Bolivia’s National Electoral Court (CNE), skeptics worried about the court’s future impartiality. Exeni was a well-known public intellectual w/ “leftist” sympathies. He even had a blog (Fadocracia), which he discontinued upon assuming the post. I wasn’t worried then, and recent events have confirmed my optimism.

I just wrapped up an article manuscript on Savina Cuéllar & the “new” regionalism in Bolivia. I focused on Santa Cruz, Tarija, and Chuquisaca (Sucre), which is interesting because lately these have become the most vocal opponents of MAS as the constitutional referendum inches closer (set for January 25, 2009).

If anyone’s in the DC area next Tuesday (December 9), I’ll be part of a panel on “Political Polarization in the Andes” at George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs. The panel will include Craig Kauffman (a Ph.D. candidate at GW), to speak about Ecuador, and possibly also John Walsh (from the Washington Office on Latin America), to speak about Venezuela.

My friend MABB beat me to it, but there’s polling data out on Bolivia’s upcoming constitutional referendum (see his post). Overall, it looks like Bolivian voters will approve the new constitution (the one modified on October 21, 2008, in a compromise between MAS & opposition legislators, not the draft approved in December 2007). But regional differences matter: polls in the cities of El Alto, Oruro, and Potosí show support for the constitution exceeding 50%; polls in the cities of Santa Cruz, Tarija, and Sucre show opposition to the constitution exceeding 50%; results in the cities of Cochabamba, La Paz, and Trinidad (capital of Beni) are more mixed (see the report in La Prensa). And there are a lot of undecided voters out there. It’s going to be a voter turnout game.

I wasn’t able to attend Evo’s speech at American University last Tuesday, but I’m glad to see it available online at AU’s speeches on campus webpage. It’s worth a look.

In the past several weeks, Evo’s government has become more aggressive towards Washington: In short order, the US ambassador, USAID, and the DEA were expelled from the country. The Peace Corps left on its own, but it too was a target of anti-US rhetoric. In response, the White House decertified Bolivia’s anti-narcotics efforts & threatened to end Bolivia’s favorable trade relationship (which threatens thousands of Bolivian jobs). Clearly, US-Bolivian relations are at a low point.

Earlier this morning I wrapped up a brief interview w/ VOA that is scheduled to appear today at 5pm EST on its television broadcast show “El Mundo al Día.” They called me in to comment on Evo’s visit to the US, the new draft constitution, and US-Bolivia relations in general. The feed will only be on their website until 5pm EST tomorrow.

Basically, these were my comments: The new draft constitution (that includes regional autonomy) is a good compromise; any new constitution must be viewed as legitimate by all major parties; Evo is not Chávez; and an Obama administration does have potential for positive developments, but Bolivia rates low in priorities.

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Addendum: It looks like they didn’t use my comments, which is probably for the best (and as a former journalist & assistant copy editor, I know how these things work). But after spending 2+ hours in a car & a $100 parking ticket, it’s kind of a bummer.

It’s been ten days since I’ve posted any updates. Clearly, I’ve been quite busy w/ teaching & other university responsibilities (there’s a lot going on), an increasingly precocious 10-month-old son (that’s a good thing), holiday planning, getting sucked into American politics & the “global economic crisis,” and trying to focus on “work-related” writing projects.

Today’s Washington Post has an interesting photo essay on a Peace Corps volunteer who chose to stay behind in Bolivia after the US evacuated the program’s personnel from the country. There’s also a feature article, detailing how other Peace Corps volunteers also chose to stay behind.

More from Maria Bruno, at Gringo Tambo.

Bolivia’s president Evo Morales offered an interesting explanation for the recent congressional negotiations, which modified the new draft constitution: He announced that he & various social movement leaders had coordinated to draft a “strong” constitution deliberately to provoke the opposition, which would then be used to bargain the opposition into accepting a more modest proposal (see “Morales revela que propuso una CPE fuerte para transar”).

One of the most interesting things about this last round of negotiations shouldn’t go unnoticed: The march for a new constitution was explicitly also one for autonomies (plural). See photo below.

I stayed away from this because it was a lot of “watching the pot boil” kind of stuff in Bolivia. They (government & opposition) were close to a compromise before, but had it all blow up in everyone’s faces. And there’s plenty of blame to go around, of course. But well after midnight, the Bolivian legislature approved a final compromise solution: a heavily amended constitution will go up for referendum January 2009 & new general elections will take place in December 2009.

If you’re in the DC area next Tuesday (October 21), you may want to check out a screening of a documentary film about Bolivia: Humillados y Ofendidos, Sucre 24 de Mayo. It will be followed by a panel discussion. The event is hosted by the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University, 7-9 pm, 957 E Street NW, Room 213.

The Bolivian political crisis is back to a respectable simmer. Even though the dialogue between government & opposition broke down several days ago, both sides agreed to throw the issue back into the legislature (where it should’ve been dealt w/ anyhow). MAS agreed to call back its protesters, allowing the legislature to deliberate in relative peace.

A number of observers have wondered what were the specific criticisms of the new draft constitution (CPE) put forward by the opposition. Yesterda’s El Deber published a brief outline of the opposition’s seven criticisms (and the relevant articles of the draft CPE). I’m simply giving rough paraphrased translations below:

If you’re in the Florida area & want to see some a live Bolivian sketch comedy show (think Saturday Night Live), check out the Chaplin Show in Miami (Saturday, October 4) & Naples (Sunday October 5). You can also check out their official website, though it has no video clips.

Bolivian negotiations have broken down after the government refused to negotiate the language in the draft constitution (it had earlier agreed to open the draft up for revision). Now Evo announced that he’ll approve the draft constitution, peacefully or not (“De buenas o de malas”). The statement was made at a MAS gathering in Cochabamba; he also announced a march on La Paz to force the National Congress to pass a bill for a referendum on the draft constitution.

It was perhaps too predictable, but the Bush administration is rescinding Bolivia’s preferential trade access to the US. The move, based on the previous White House declaration that Bolivia failed to meet up to its drug war obligations, is clearly a further response to the recent expulsion of the US ambassador from Bolivia. For its part, Bolivian government has declared the move an “attack on democracy.”

It looks like things are calming down in Bolivia. The fear of pro-government & opposition forces clashing in Santa Cruz didn’t materialize after MAS supporters lifted their blockades & agreed to stand down. The issue is being thrown back into the legislature’s lap, which is where it belonged all along. And it’s good that the government is opening up the entire draft constitution for debate (though not in the legislature, but in round table discussions between Evo & the prefects).

From an email from my parents (who live in Santa Cruz):

Evo announced an alleged a coup plot between Goldberg (the US ambassador expelled a few days ago), Costas (the Santa Cruz prefect), and a number of high-ranking military officers. Meanwhile, reports from Pando suggest that five of the bodies were Venezuelan soldiers, who are being repatriated. Costas has also asked Evo to call of the MAS protests who are still marching towards the city of Santa Cruz; he’s also called for a suspension of labor & a public assembly in the main plaza for a cabildo (a “popular assembly”) to decide what to do. (FYI: The last Santa Cruz cabildo proclaimed Costas “governor” & demanded regional autonomy.) Also, as of now, the 24 de Septiembre celebrations are cancelled—the first time that has happened in more than 50 years. This doesn’t look good at all.

Despite signs of progress, Bolivia is again becoming tense. The last two weeks, the blame fell squarely on the opposition. This week, most of the blame falls on the government. MAS supporters are marching on Santa Cruz; they have been for days. All this while the government seeks a compromise w/ the opposition, but making no effort to prevent tens of thousands of (many of whom are armed) from descending from rural Cochabamba towards Santa Cruz in two columns (one from the west, one from the north). The marchers are calling for the resignation of Rubén Costas (the Santa Cruz prefect) & Branko Marinkovic (president of the Comité Cívico de Santa Cruz). Essentially, the government is using the marchers to push the opposition back to the negotiation table to accept a deal.

It was a farily predictable outcome (at least I thought so). But Evo is offering regional autonomy in exchange for support for the draft constitution. The draft constitution includes regional autonomy, of course. And, as I pointed out before, the distance between that model & some of the “autonomic statutes” wasn’t great.

MABB suggests Evo’s government made significant compromises in agreeing to the framework for dialogue. I’m inclined to agree. The document—published in La Razón (which I linked to yesterday)—opens up for discussion the following items: the new constitution, regional autonomy, the IDH (direct taxes on oil & gas revenues, which the media luna prefects demand be returned to them), and the naming of vacant posts (electoral court, constitutional tribunal, etc).

It’s been a tense roller coaster ride (which isn’t yet 100% over of course), but it looks like there’s a compromise in place between Evo’s government & the opposition prefects. Hopefully, this means that things will start getting back to “normal” again soon enough.

There are signs that calm & order may be returning to Bolivia after several tumultuous days. In the aftermath of more than a dozen dead, 30+ injured, and as many as 100 missing in Pando, the government is seeking to reestablish control. There are still some blockades throughout parts of the media luna, as well as worrying signs of sporadic confrontations. But the volume of such confrontations has greatly diminished. These are optimistic signs.

Things are, it seems, returning to calm in Bolivia. Evo has made remarkable overtures for compromise—and so far it seems like the opposition prefects are willing to negotiate as well. A tentative agreement between Evo’s government & the opposition may be in place soon. There are still, of course, troubling signs. Both opposition & government supporters are an alert, preparing to face each other again. It may take time for the state security forces (police & military) to regain full control.

Just a quick update while visiting family in the DC area. An email from my mom states that the US embassy is now advising all Americans to leave the country; 100 have been evacuated already. My parents still haven't decided what they'll do. But things do seem to be calm in Santa Cruz; the center of this current crisis is Pando.

Chavez has again criticized the Bolivian military, and continues to speak of intervention in case Evo's government falls. The South American UNASUR countries will meet in Santiago, Chile, to discuss the situation. Brazil's Lula & Chile's Bachelet are leading calls for calm & calling all sides back to negotiate.

The Bolivian army is now mobilizing to Pando. They're tasked w/ restoring order & arresting the prefect. There are also reports that journalists are being prevented from covering the story as they're held by military personnel for their own safety. The death toll in Pando continues to rise (it's now at least 15 dead).

Also, various groups are mobilizing. One that should be noted are the Chiquitanos (an indigenous group from the Santa Cruz lowlands). But the Chiquitanos are backing the Comite Civico de Santa Cruz in "defense of the IDH" (the oil/gas rents collected by the government & returned to the departments, which has been recently cut). Regional alliances are quickly starting to dominate the agenda.

After deadly clashes between pro-MAS & opposition forces in the department, Evo has declared a state of siege in Pando. The order bars public meetings of any kind, the carrying of weapons, and imposes a curfew. Meanwhile military forces mobilized to restore order in the media luna departments. In addition, Bolivia’s military issued a statement condemning Chavez for suggesting that Venezuela might intervene militarily. In Santa Cruz, a women’s march in front of the Venezuelan consulate called for the removal of foreign presence (there have long been rumors of Venezuelan troops in Bolivia, including their involvement in the government raid on Viru Viru airport a year ago).

My mom (who lives in Santa Cruz) tipped me off to the news that Ponchos Rojos are mobilizing to recapture government installations in the media luna. Along w/ other pro-MAS social movement organizations, they’ve announced their defense of Evo’s government.

There’s continued confrontations between pro-MAS & opposition groups throughout the “media luna”—particularly in Santa Cruz & Tarija. La Razón has a series of stories on the developments: virtually all public institutions in Santa Cruz are taken over by pro-autonomy groups; Tarija & Villamontes civic groups seized the gas field at Vuelta Grande; civic & campesino groups clashed in Tarija; MAS groups cut of San Julián & threaten to march on Santa Cruz; El Alto residents demand arms to defend the government; there was an explosion at the Tarija prefect’s garage; campesinos from Chuquisaca & Potosí threaten to cut of Sucre again; American Airlines is no longer flying to Bolivia & the airports at Cobija (Pando), Trinidad (Beni), Guayaramerín (Beni), and Tarija are taken over by pro-autonomy civic groups.

There’s state of virtual civil war in Santa Cruz, and dangerously headed towards a more serious confrontation. It’s been brewing for a while. But things are spiraling out of control as UJC thugs attacked government (and pro-government) installations. Pro-government groups have announced reprisals to follow. There’s also reports of tensions between Evo & military leaders over why the military didn’t act quickly to restore order (the military demanded written authorization from the president, since such efforts would produce deaths).

Matt Shugart, Greg Weeks, and Boz have been commenting on the growing rift between Cristina & Cobos. Since casting a tie-breaking vote in the Senate against the Argentine president (Cristina Fernández de Kirchner), the vice president (Julio Cobos) has openly joined the opposition. Now, Cobos may rejoin the Radical Party (UCR) & is expected to run for president (against either Crisitina or her husband, Néstor Kirchner) in 2011. It raises a number of interesting questions about the institutional role of vps in presidential democracies.

MABB has a good post on the crisis of the state in Bolivia (increasingly Bolivia fails to meet Max Weber’s classic definition of a “state”). In addition, he reflects on the use of polarizing discourse as the new modus operandi of Bolivian politics.

In an interesting twist, MAS supporters issued a call for the resignation of José Luis Exeni (the president of the National Electoral Court), calling him a “traitor to the social movements” for his statement that the CNE couldn’t go forward w/ the elections Evo called for by executive decree because of legal obstacles. Last night, the CNE issued a statement making clear that elections must be convoked by parliament, not by executive decree. Earlier, Exeni (named to the post by Evo) was criticized by the opposition, who accused him of being too sympathetic to MAS.

Maria Bruno, archeologist & ex-Fulbright fellow, posted some sage advice on visa requirements for US visitors to Bolivia (including academic visas). As she notes, things have gotten much more expensive & complicated. I’m curious to see how this will effect the tourist industry (particularly in rural outlying areas frequented by more the backpacker crowd).

This is going to be the biggest electoral year in Bolivia’s history, it seems. So far 2008 has seen four departments hold their own autonomy referendums, a special by-election for prefect in Chuquisaca, and a nationwide recall referendum. Now it looks like we’ll see yet another round of elections: two referendums on the proposed constitution, by-elections for the prefects of La Paz & Cochabamba, and the country’s first ever elections for subprefects (provincial governors) & departmental councils. The elections are scheduled for December 7.

Just a quick note during a break in the project conference at UCSD. Since this is a mini-conference on electoral system, I’ll ignore the issue of the current bloqueos across Bolivia (especially around the gas-rich Chaco region). The interesting thing is that the future of Oruro’s prefect is uncertain. W/ the final results of the recall referendum, Alberto Aguilar (MAS) won 50.85%. That’s a slim majority, but according to the actual rules of the recall, he came up a bit short (I can’t now remember how short). Of course, the opposition had fought for the rules to be changed to accept only a simple majority; we'll see now whether partisanship overrides principle.

I don’t have time now to summarize the new phase of Bolivia’s political crisis (which included violence directed at the national police). But I think Costas overplayed his hand. He had a chance to use the results of the recall referendum as a springboard for a workable political compromise—which may still be on the table—but he opted instead to go for broke.

An anonymous comment to the previous post asks if the presidential powers are increased in the proposed constitution (CPE), relative to the existing CPE (the 2004 Constitution).

I thought it’d be interesting to look at the draft of the proposed Bolivian constitution approved a few months to see how it treats departmental autonomy.

After approving Departmental Law Nº 05, Santa Cruz plans to go forward w/ regional elections (currently scheduled for January 2009). The central government, of course, isn’t happy w/ the move. But it’s not yet clear what steps it’ll take to prevent the wholesale creation of an autonomous government structure in Santa Cruz.

Still no final numbers on Bolivia’s recall referendum, but results are already much clearer. W/ a near-final vote count, Oruro’s prefect is safe w/ just over 50% of the vote. That means that only 2 of 8 prefects up for recall lost their seats: Manfred Reyes Villa in Cochabamba & José Luis (“Pepelucho”) Paredes in La Paz. At least now Reyes Villa is also acknowledging his defeat.

The votes in Bolivia’s recall referendum are still being counted, but the results are well established by now (Evo won, as did most of the prefects). One of the losers was the La Paz prefect, José Luis Paredes. Formerly of MIR, he recently founded his own party (Plan Progreso) & was allied w/ PODEMOS. He conceded his defeat (something Cochabamba’s Manfred Reyes Villa hasn’t done).

MABB already posted the exit polls. But it looks like Evo will keep his seat (no surprise), and so will all of the pro-autonomy prefects (as will the Potosí prefect).

Bolivia’s recall referendum started today, though it’s not yet clear what counting formula will be used in the end (not the best scenario, of course). MABB has a good roundup of this.

There’s been growing attention to the issue of regional divisions in Bolivia in the last few years. Of course, these didn’t start w/ Evo’s election (they have much, much longer histories). But they’ve certainly accelerated since early 2004, when a movement demanding regional political autonomy gained momentum. Nowhere is this truer than in Santa Cruz.

We’re coming up on the final 48 hours before Sunday’s recall referendum in Bolivia. Not much is likely to happen between now & then, based on legal restrictions placed before any vote (e.g. no alcohol can be sold, motorized transportation is restricted to authorized vehicles). As of this morning, the CNE is virtually running the country (in the sense that it has temporary command authority over the country's security forces).

I mentioned earlier some recent protests unsettling Evo’s government (mostly because they’re coming from the left, not the right). The protests have both escalated, and spread.

Wednesday (August 6th) is Bolivia’s national holiday. And the national team is playing an exhibition match at RFK stadium in Washington, DC. And it looks like Jaime Moreno will be playing. Wow. I’m so glad Baltimore is only a Light Rail, a MARC, and two Metro rides away.¹ So, yes, K8 & I will be there, wearing our jerseys.

I didn’t actually attend the Boston ASA conference (K8 was giving a paper, so I was “Mr. Mom” & watched Javi). But K8 picked us up some interesting new books (all from Duke University Press).

With 10 days before the recall referendum, Evo might be heading into a tight spot. A strike by the COB (the Bolivian workers’ federation) has gained steam, and yesterday miners shut down much of the government in La Paz. The COB objects to Evo’s new pension plan, which doesn’t go as far as they would like (they insist that Evo’s government adopt the COB proposal w/o modifications).

A recent poll suggests that Evo would survive a recall referendum in Bolivia, w/ 49% in favor of keeping him in office, 18% opposed, and 33% undecided.

I’ve just uploaded the paper I’ll be presenting at the APSA meeting at the end of August: “Bolivia’s Party System after October 2003: Where Did all the Politicians Go?”

A year ago, friend & fellow Bolivian blogger Eddie Evila (of Barrio Flores) launched a project to help encourage more blogs from Bolivia—specifically in less affluent areas (his project started in El Alto).

There’s a running debate on the constitutionality of Bolivia’s recall referendums scheduled (tentatively) for August 10 over at MABB. I’ve weighed in w/ some thoughts on the legal backing of some recent related constitutional matters. But I’ve included the lengthier comment here:

You’ve gotta at least admire Quispe’s chutzpah. After allegations surfaced recently about ties between FARC, Venezuela, and Quispe’s EGTK guerrilla group, the famous Mallku (“prince”) of the Aymara katarista movement came forward w/ a press statement openly stating that he has FARC sympathies—though pointing out that he also has programmatic differences w/ the Colombian guerrillas.

Fallout from the capture of a FARC leader’s laptop in Ecuador a few months ago is starting to have some (predictable) fallout in Bolivia. Today’s La Razón has a series of articles on relationships between FARC & Bolivian groups.

It’s been an interesting past several days in Bolivia, though I’m still not sure how either of the two controversies will end. The first revolves around a series of accusations from the opposition regarding potential vote fraud in the upcoming (August 10) recall referendum. The second involves the case of Georges Nava, the army officer arrested in connection to an explosion at a Tarija television station on the eve of that department’s autonomy referendum. (Ironically, Nava was listed as working for the army’s anti-terrorism unit.)

In a new wrinkle to the upcoming recall referendum, Bolivia’s senate passed modifications to the referendum law. The new law would only require a simple majority (50%+1) for both Evo & the prefects to keep their seats; currently the number varies on the basis of the December 2005 votes (from 46.26% for Evo to 62.012% for Pepe Lucho [José Luis Paredes], the La Paz prefect).

With the upcoming recall referendum in Bolivia, there’s growing speculation about whether the embattled Evo Morales will hang on to his presidential seat. The following graph might help:

The recall referendum campaign has started in earnest in Bolivia. On August 10, Bolivian voters in 8 of 9 departments (not Chuquisaca, which only recently elected a prefect) will vote on whether their prefects should keep their posts. They’ll also vote (in all departments) on whether the president, Evo Morales, should keep his.

I was recently asked to write something about Bolivia’s foreign policy for e-IR, a new online international relations journal published by students at Oxford, University of Leicester, and the London School of Economics. The essay (“Bolivia’s New International Stage”) looks at the country’s international relations in the first two years of Evo’s government.

As expected, Savina Cuéllar won the race for Chuquisaca prefect by a comfortable margin over the MAS candidate (57.3 to 39.4 percent). Although these are unofficial “quick” counts, they’re not expected to change much. (Official results from the National Electoral Court, w/ only about half of the vote counted, so far gives Cuéllar almost 75 percent of the vote.)

Chuquisaca voters go to the polls today to elect a new prefect to replace interim prefect Ariel Iriarte. The previous prefect, David Sánchez (MAS) resigned over the government’s handling of the social unrest during the final days of the constituent assembly process in Sucre last December, which left three dead.

As expected, voters in Tarija approved an autonomy statute by wide margins. Though final counts aren’t yet in, preliminary counts show that the “Sí” vote reached about 80%. Voters in Santa Cruz, Beni, and Pando have already approved autonomy statutes. It also currently looks as if voter turnout was higher than in the three other departments, despite attempts at preventing the vote by pro-MAS activists.

Back from vacation (and only now w/ cable/internet restored). Still catching up w/ news, email, work, etc. More later.

But some startling news from Tarija: An explosion at a Canal 4 installation in Yacuiba, Tarija. The department of Tarija is today wrapping up its own autonomy referendum election. At least one suspect (who has admitted to complicity) w/ ties to the presidential palace was rounded up: Lt. Georgef Peter Nava Zurita is identified as a member of the presidential guard. Another 19 civilians were arrested in connection. While Evo’s government denies any connection to Nava (though La Razón reporters who called for information pretending to be his cousin were given the opposite impression), opposition leaders are claiming this is a sign of Evo’s “state terrorism.”

Tomorrow will bring preliminary results of Tarija’s autonomy referendum. This now makes four such votes. Evo’s government has rejected all such referendums as illegal, and pro-MAS supporters have mobilized to prevent voting in each of the four regional referendum elections.

I’ve been meaning to post a note about my objections to the use of the term “race” when discussing Bolivian social politics (I prefer the term “ethnicity”). A brief report in today’s La Razón provides a great starting point: The Qhara Qhara “nation” was “reborn” yesterday.

Roberto Sándoval, campaign manager for an opposition candidate, has been freed (see news report). The ruling was made by a judge in an El Alto court, after state prosecutors were unable to present any evidence, indictments, or warrants against Sándoval. In effect, the judge ruled the arrest—made by agents of the Intelligence and Government ministries—illegal (see previous post).

The campaign manager (Roberto Sándoval) for an opposition candidate for the Chuquisaca prefecture (Sabina Cuéllar) was detained yesterday (see news report). He’s accused various crimes, including sedition & attempted “magnicide” (stemming from pro-government & opposition forces a few weeks ago in Sucre). If true, they’re serious crimes, of course. Yet the circumstances of his detention seemed questionable: A number of unidentified, masked men forced him into a vehicle. The government only acknowledged his arrest & announced its indictment 12 hours later, after his wife denounced his kidnapping.

It’s been a hectic two weeks. Since May 15, we’ve moved to Baltimore, held our son’s christening, attended two weddings (one in DC, one in Carlisle), and hosted a reunion of the Centellas brothers for Andy & Saloumeh’s MBA graduations in Delaware. We also attended two Orioles games, bought new furniture at IKEA, and have started to explore our new Mount Washington (or is it Roland Park?) neighborhood.

Bolivia’s politics shifted south this weekend. Evo suspended a planned trip to the Sucre (on the 199th anniversary of Bolivia’s “declaration of independence”¹) after university students & other local groups mobilized in opposition.

A reader tipped me off to a new public opinion poll in Los Tiempos conducted by the political science department at UMSA (Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, the public university in La Paz). Unlike most polls, it includes a smaller eastern city (Montero) among its respondent sample in addition to the regular urban samples (La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz). The total sample was about 3,000 respondents.

I’m starting to put together my syllabi for next year. And so I’ve been reading some new books that I plan to use for my classes. Currently, I’m working my way through an incredibly interesting book on Nepal: Many Tongues, One People by Arjun Guneratne.

A quick clarification in light of today’s argument that Bolivia’s political opposition suggests that a recall referendum may be unconstitutional: I don’t care.

A surprising development in Bolivia: If Evo enacts a law approved by the Senate (as he said he would), there will be a recall referendum in Bolivia as early as August (90 days after the law is enacted). The recall referendum would put Evo & the country’s nine prefects up for an up or down popular vote of confidence.

Human Rights Foundation (HRF) has posted its preliminary report on the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum.

While all attention is currently on Santa Cruz, it’s important to look ahead to June 22. That’s when Tarija will hold its autonomy referendum (making it the 4th department to hold such a vote). Santa Cruz leaders will wait until then to negotiate collectively w/ the central government.

The Santa Cruz departmental electoral court (CDE) website has updated official counts, as they’re processed. They’re using the same software/process (SIRENA) as the national electoral court (CNE)—which is the software/process used by each of the regional electoral courts during national elections.

The official count will be made public by Friday. But this morning’s reports show that “Sí” (pro autonomy) won by 86% to 14% in yesterday’s Santa Cruz autonomy referendum. It seems unlikely that these figures will change significantly. Some brief analysis:

The official results aren’t in yet. But El Deber (and other media) reports that the “Sí” vote won in the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum—by a wide margin (exit polling has it 85.3% to 14.7% in the city, 89.6% to 10.4% in the rural areas).

Today’s Santa Cruz autonomy referendum is under way. There won’t be much news until later, of course. But the morning news highlighted problems in Yapacaní & San Julian.

Tomorrow, Santa Cruz goes to the polls in its autonomy referendum. The central government is still adamantly opposed, of course. On the eve of the election, it’s also clear that there is little that can be done to stop it. But what will happen?

Boz beat me to the latest poll numbers out of Bolivia: Evo retains 54% public approval (down from 56% in March) across Bolivia, according to the latest poll.

I’m trying to keep up w/ the escalating tension between the central government & Santa Cruz as the May 4 autonomy referendum approaches. As of the end of this week, the legal maneuvers have started to heat up: The central government has cut off the prefecture’s finances, and is preparing legal actions against the prefect & other regional leaders. In turn, the opposition (which controls the Senate, but not the House of Deputies) is initiating legal proceedings against the head of the national electoral court (the renegade regional electoral organism is moving forward with organizing the vote). All the while, the last remaining member of the Constitutional Tribunal (whose members were purged, or quit, w/ no replacements named) has initiated proceedings against the vice president for overstepping his constitutional powers. And this doesn’t begin to address the problems of social movements & counter-movements. In short, it’s a mess.

The question is, perhaps, exaggerated. Clearly, Evo—still the head of Bolivia’s cocalero federation—is an important leader w/in Bolivia’s anti-neoliberal social movements.

I’m a little late getting this news out. But. April 19 is “Día de las Voces Bolivianas” (Bolivian Voices Day).

There have been calls in the past for Evo to step down, but now they’ve become more commonplace.

We’re now a little more than three weeks away from the May 4th autonomy referendum in Santa Cruz. A broad social movement¹ calling for regional autonomy has been active in force since January 2004, coming on the heels of the October 2003 “gas war” (which pitted a very different constellation of social movements against Goni’s government).

Things in Bolivia have become increasingly tense in the last few weeks. We’re now about five weeks away from the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum (set for Sunday, May 4th).

The spring speaker series I put together at Dickinson is winding down, w/ two final speakers who will focus on the Andes.

No shooting (at least not yet), but there’s a police mutiny in Bolivia.

The problems stemming from Colombia’s incursion into Ecuador a few days ago (when Colombian armed forces killed a leading FARC rebel leader) continue. Much of the problem stems from two counts:

Both Open Veins (“Colonialism at the UN”) & The Gringo Tambo (“UN international narcotics board calls on Bolivia to outlaw coca leaf”) have already commented on the recent UN report on coca. GT quotes some of the language in the UN document; Open Veins gives historical background on the matter.

There’s an excellent article in this month’s Le Monde Diplomatique on the current situation in Bolivia: “Bolivia: Morales is Checked” by Hervé Do Alto and Franck Poupeau (trans. George Miller).

In a brief 30-minute session last night, Bolivia’s legislature approved two constitutional referendums & annulled the proposed Santa Cruz & Beni autonomy referendum. The vote took place as pro-MAS protestors lay siege to the parliament building for several days, and as at least two female opposition candidates were beaten as they tried to enter the legislative session. Opposition legislators were refused the floor, the votes took place following no discussion, and the brief session took place with dozens of pro-MAS protesters crowded into the gallery.

For the past several weeks, Carlos Hugo Molina (of Ágora) has been noting internal contradictions (i.e. places were the text itself states different things in different sections) or other problems in the new Bolivian draft constitution approved last December. When I get time, I hope to put them together into an English-language summary. In the meantime, here are the links to the posts: two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten.

Boz, who frequently posts poll numbers from across Latin America, has some interesting poll numbers for Peru.

About five years ago, when I was doing fieldwork in Bolivia, there were only a handful Bolivian bloggers. That number has since expanded to include hundreds, and is rapidly expanding today.

First, let me be clear: the two cases are not similar in some critical & fundamental ways. But what is interesting is the political international repercussions that a secession implies.

In an interesting (though not entirely surprising) political turn, Evo has been reigned in by his own supporters (the organizaciones de base). Only days before, Evo had publicly struck out against the Santa Cruz autonomy movement (which is steamrolling forward), claiming that his supporters were willing to use force if necessary, then calling on the military & “social bases” to mobilize.

There’s been some discussion about a recent ABC News report that a Fulbright scholar in Bolivia was asked to “spy” on Venezuelans & Cubans in Bolivia (to be precise: to report if he had seen any, who, and where) during his mandatory security briefing.¹ I’ll refer to the discussion at Gringo Tambo (a group blog of primarily ex-Fulbrighters who study Bolivia).

In many ways, Santa Cruz has long been a “rebel” department in Bolivia. Throughout the two centuries of the republic’s existence (Bolivia will celebrate its bicentennial in 2026), Santa Cruz has frequently opposed the central government. But the current conflict between the central government of Evo Morales & the oppositional prefect of Ruben Costas (supported by various regional “civic” organizations) is a new development.

Three new developments highlight the importance of regions (departments) Bolivian politics.

Today’s La Razón has a special on six “grupos de choque” that play important roles in current Bolivian politics.

Yesterday evening, Óscar Ortiz (PODEMOS) was elected the new Senate President. The position also makes him third in line of succession; he would become interim president if Evo & Alvaro García Linera were both absent from the country (they both frequently travel).

There’s an interesting conflict brewing w/in Bolivia’s National Electoral Court (CNE). The newly appointed CNE president (José Luis Exeni) is asking the Santa Cruz regional electoral court to stop verifying the signatures for a referendum initiative. The initiative would establish a department-wide referendum on the “autonomic” statute (read text of the Santa Cruz autonomic statute).

I’ve long noticed splits between the MAS rank-and-file & Evo Morales. While Evo has, at times, been conciliatory, the rank-and-file is much more radical. Last week, Evo met w/ the country’s prefects & suggested that their autonomy statutes could be “reconciled” w/ the new draft constitution. Yesterday, MAS constituent assembly delegates made it clear to Evo that they would not modify the draft constitution.

A few weeks ago, a pro-government majority (the opposition was absent) of the Constituent Assembly (CA) approved a new draft constitution (after a last-minute change of venue). It was barely debated, and voted upon in only a few hours. This followed weeks of unrest, including four deaths in Sucre. Not surprisingly, the opposition recoiled. In response, several lowland departments announced their own “autonomy statutes” & prepared to take them to department-wide referendums.

After a tense month (which followed several other tense months), Bolivia’s political situation shows signs of hope. Both the government & the opposition prefects (regional governors) have been meeting, w/ aims of coming to a solution that could integrate the new constitution w/ demands for regional autonomy. One standout is Pepelucho (José Luis Paredes), the opposition La Paz prefect, who’s begun challenging the government for its alleged neglect of the La Paz regional government.

A number of Bolivian poll numbers in La Razón today:

Today’s La Razón has an interesting article on the Bolivian government’s proposed new budget. The figures include about Bs.10.1 million (about US$1.2 million) for “social movements” (which primarily seems to mean organized unions & sindicatos). The figure, of course, is merely a fraction of the budget (about 0.1% of total projected spending)—so it’s probably not as big a deal as the news report suggests. But it’s still a little troubling.

As expected, Bolivia has entered a holiday truce (a cuarto intermedio). No doubt things will heat up again after the New Year. But for now things are simmering down. Let’s hope it stays that way.

For some time now, Peru’s government has been demanding that Bolivia extradite Walter Chávez, a Peruvian citizen wanted for his alleged connection to MRTA (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, an urban Maoist terrorist organization). Walter Chávez is a fairly well known journalist w/ leftist sympathies who served as advisor to Evo Morales’s presidential campaigns in 2002 & 2005. The Bolivian government has declined to extradite him to Peru & has offered political asylum. The (relatively minor) issue has been on the back burner for some time now. Walter Chávez, of course, denies the allegations; he stepped down as a presidential advisor in February 2007.

A recent poll by Equipos Mori shows the pro-autonomy position gaining ground from July 2006 to today. The poll suggests that “Yes” would win in a new referendum on autonomy in 6 of 9 departments (in a 50/42 split).

This could be unrelated to the political news, of course, but ERBOL (and other sources) report a bomb explosion just past noon in Santa Cruz. The explosion (reportly large enough to destroy a car) went off in the 6th floor of the Palacio de Justicia. No injuries are reported.

Today will be an interesting day in Bolivia. In La Paz, the government & its supporters are celebrating the new constitution (CPE), w/ a march through the city. Meanwhile, many in Santa Cruz will celebrate the region’s self-declared autonomy. So will Beni, Pando, and Tarija. And Chuquisaca is moving in that direction, too. All five departments have either finished “autonomic statutes” or are working on them. Santa Cruz is preparing to hold its own referendum election.

Problems continue w/ Bolivia’s new constitution. According to a La Razón report, a small committee is modifying the text outside of committee & after it was approved by the assembly. This is the latest in a series of “irregularities” in the procedure by which the constitution was approved. It doesn’t help, of course, that an “official” version of the final document hasn’t yet been made publicly available. There’s a version on the assembly’s website, but it’s dated November 24 and labeled a “draft” (proyecto de ley).

Today’s La Razón has another special supplement on the new constitution. It offers some more detail on some of the text’s provisions. Meanwhile, Carlos Hugo Molina reminds us that there is no official document yet. Even w/o an opposition present (whether through boycott or intimidation), assembly delegates couldn’t agree on 8 articles (out of 408), which are still on the table. Thus, it’s still unclear what the final draft will look like.

As expected, the new Bolivian constitution has been approved (w/ some minor changes) yesterday evening. La Razón has a special supplement on the new constitution. Meanwhile, civic leaders in Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Tarija, and Cochabamba are calling for autonomy by December 15 (though “autonomy” is not the same as “independence”). Of course, the new constitution includes 30 articles detailing departmental autonomy (including formation of regional assemblies), so this may be unnecessary.

The draft Bolivian constitution will likely be ratified by the end of today. The document is being read quickly & voted w/ little debate. Less than 24 hours after the assembly voted to meet in Oruro, newspapers report that 147 of the articles were ratified. The document is 100 pages long, has 408 articles in total. As of a few weeks ago & about 15 months after its installation, not a single article had been agreed upon by the body, which nearly fell apart. The rushed vote is conducted, as in Sucre, w/ thousands of cocaleros and pro-MAS miners guarding the meeting site. The opposition PODEMOS is no longer participating in the process & five regional civic committees have already rejected the new document.

This has been a hectic week, and things are starting to move incredibly quickly, following the rushed passage of a draft constitution, making it difficult to keep up. But here are some quick updates on the Bolivian situation.

Following the last two weeks’ events, Evo proposes a recall referendum for himself & the country’s nine prefects. In the announcement, he asked voters to decide whether they are “in favor of change” or “continuing the neoliberal model.” No date is scheduled yet. But this is an interesting turn of events.

But there is a recall law already on the table (submitted on January 19, 2007). It stipulates that presidents, prefects, or mayors elected by an absolute majority (50%+1) can be recalled only if they are opposed by one additional percentage point in the recall referendum. This means that a vote to recall Evo must win 54.7% of the national vote. But for those who won w/ simply pluralities, a simple majority will do to remove them from office. No prefect won election w/ an absolute majority.

Ironically, few (if any) prefects have lost significant support over the past months. The one key exception is the David Sánchez (MAS), the Chuquisaca prefect. But if he’s voted out of office, a new election would likely appoint an opposition figure. This would leave MAS w/ only two prefectures: Oruro & Potosí. It’s possible, of course, that MAS could wrest the La Paz prefecture away from Pepelucho (José Luis Paredes, PODEMOS).

The greatest danger of this kind of plebiscitary democracy, of course, is that it leaves little incentive for compromise or dialogue. If the government & its opponents go into campaign mode on a single, polarizing question, political divisions are only going to worsen. And what if the vote to reject Evo is close nationally but lopsided regionally? Imagine if Evo is approved by 52% (his current standing in the polls) but rejected by two thirds (or more) of media luna voters. What then?

Angus Reid’s Global Monitor just released the latest poll for Bolivia. Evo is down 10 points from last month (from 62 to 52 percent approval). I don’t know how this breaks down across the country (the pollsters interviewed residents of La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz, the four major cities). But the figures are consistent w/ what one would expect after the tumultuous past weeks.

By now most people have commented on the defeat of Chávez’s constitutional reform proposal in yesterday’s referendum vote. The fact that Chávez came out quickly to accept the defeat is a positive signal. It means that Venezuela is not as “authoritarian” as some of its harshest critics would suggest. Hopefully, this will push Chávez to reconsider some of his ambitions (i.e. his desire for indefinite reelections)—especially since he made the constitutional referendum a personal issue (a vote for or against himself).

I’ve spoken to my parents (who live in Santa Cruz) and they’re fine. Otherwise, the situation in Bolivia is now very tense. They’re usually a pattern to these kinds of things, and they’re largely seasonal. The fact that political tensions are escalating even as the Christmas season approaches is a very bad sign (usually politics takes a “break” for Christmas and Easter festivities).

An alleged copy of the draft constitution approved Saturday is online here (hat tip to Sergio Molina Monasterios). I’ve only had a few brief moments to look it over (it’s 100 pages long, single spaced). But it’s not identical to the MAS draft constitution published in Bolivian newspapers on August 15, 2007.

Sergio Molina Monasterios posted commentary on the recent media coverage of the Ponchos Rojos decapitating two dogs to demonstrate their “fury” & threatening to do the same to leaders of the media luna (the anti-MAS civic movements in Bolivia’s eastern lowlands).

Bolivia is again on the edge of the precipice. Street confrontation in Sucre have left at least two dead (w/ the unconfirmed death of a third, a police officer). The Bolivian press is now calling this “Black November” (recalling Goni’s 2003 “Black October”).

Bolivia’s Constituent Assembly (or at least 136 members of the body’s 255 members) approved a new constitutional text late last night in Sucre (about 100 opposition delegates were absent). Since last week, 145 delegates & other government officials were holed up in La Glorieta (a colonial castle turned military academy). Outside, the city of Sucre was convulsed by anti-government protests; confrontations w/ security forces left at least one dead (a young lawyer) & hundreds injured. According to Correo del Sur, tear gas was already drifting up into the Assembly’s chamber as it rushed to vote on the text of the draft constitution. Shortly after midnight, delegates snuck out of La Glorieta.

More on Thanksgiving (which was fun) later. But now a brief update on the deteriorating situation in Bolivia.

My proposal for the 2008 MPSA (Midwest Political Science Association) conference has just been accepted. Time for my research assistant & I to get cracking on our database project. Here’s the proposal (sorry the abstract is so long):

Ever since the 1984-1985 hyperinflation (which hit 60,000 percent in its final month), Bolivians have been especially worried about inflation. And except for a spike in 1991 (21.4%), inflation in Bolivia has remained below 20% since 1985. Today’s La Razón has a special section on inflation. So far, it doesn’t look like a major crisis yet, but food prices are creeping up (particularly in La Paz-El Alto). As La Razón points out, inflation is a “tax” on poor people (though clearly the most affected are the lower middle classes & micro entrepreneurs).

After weeks of tension between Sucre civic leaders & Evo’s government, the assembly delegates decided to go back to Sucre to work. Three different negotiations had broken down, regardless of any offer made by the government as Sucre became inflexible on its core demand: discussion of the capital issue (Sucre leaders want the capital moved back to Sucre from La Paz).

Being swamped last week, I didn’t post about a number of items related to Bolivia. Apologies. But I wanted to go back and comment on the latest round of monthly opinion polling on Evo’s presidency.

This is cross-posted at the LAPIS blog:

MABB (the “other Miguel”) has an excellent summary of recent constituent assembly news. Today’s La Razón reports that delegates will decide the future of the assembly. One of the three options? Close the assembly. I’ve no idea what that would do to the process of writing a new constitution (though likely it would simply mean using the legislature to write a new constitution, as happened in 1995 & 2004).

I’ve been swamped w/ work (particularly trying to make better progress on my book manuscript) the past few days. But Bolivia is still simmering. There was another clash between university students and police in Santa Cruz. Students from UAGRM (Universidad Autonóma Gabriel René Moreno), joined by a number of other civic groups, marched in opposition to the government’s plan to reduce the share of hydrocarbons tax revenue to municipalities, departments, and universities. The laws that regulate the tax structure (since 1994) stipulate that 20% must go directly to the country’s municipalities (on a per capita basis), and other 5% must go to the universities (all Bolivian public universities are autonomously self-governed since the 1940s). At least 10 were injured. The UAGRM students will be joined today and over the weekend by other mobilizations, including the UMSA (Universidad Mayor de San Andrés) university students from La Paz.

There were attacks against the Venezuelan consulate & a Cuban medical mission early this morning in Santa Cruz. From police reports in La Razón, the attacks involved small dynamite (probably the “M-80s” frequently used in Bolivian protests), and no one was injured. But this is the first attack on any embassy or consulate in recent memory (to my knowledge). It follows days after a government military assault on the city’s airport re-stoked anti-government tensions (see previous post).

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PS. Just to be clear: I don’t endorse such attacks on any embassy, consulate, public building, or private residence or business. By anyone. At any time.

I get the INESAD (Institute for Advanced Development Studies) newsletters in my email on a regular basis. This most recent one on the government’s new Renta Dignidad (an expanded version of the BONOSOL pension) is interesting:

“Governments Giving Gifts – Populations Acquiring Rights”

Here’s a report from Human Rights Foundation Bolivia on the Viru Viru assault. It’s in Spanish, but it tries to give as detailed an account of the event as possible, as well as noting that several television images clearly showed Venezuelan troops (plural) inside the airport (though there’s no proof they were directly involved in the operation). The highlights:

Things seem to have calmed down in Bolivia. The conflict’s certainly not “over”—but at least there’s a respite.

I am, however, increasingly bothered by the references to the presence of Venezuelan troops in Bolivian—and particularly that this isn’t covered in the international media. Are there Venezuelan troops in Bolivia? If so, how many? And what is their purpose? Recently, elite Bolivian troops have begun training in Venezuela in “intelligence” and “urban combat.” Is Venezuela opening its own School of the Americas? This is particularly troubling since Chávez recently threatened to turn Bolivian into another “Vietnam.”

I just got an email from my mom (in Santa Cruz, Bolivia) and am reading the papers. The government seized the Santa Cruz airport (w/ a nighttime air assault by elite forces). At least 10 were injured. According to my mom, Venezuelan troops were involved (though I haven’t seen this in the press reports). The Santa Cruz prefect has called on residents to resist the government’s takeover. This is going to get very ugly, very fast. Here’s more from the International Herald Tribune. There were clearly problems w/ Viru Viru (which prompted the government takeover). But I don’t think going in w/ unrestrained military force was the answer.

El Alto is getting restless again. Irate parents destroyed & burned four blocks along calle Jorge Callasco in the 12 de Octubre neighborhood. The parents were angry that merchants were selling alcohol (and other vices) in the area, which is close to schools. Evo’s government is accusing the mayor of mishandling the situation. Meanwhile, the local police authorities (who by all accounts did nothing) admit that they can’t guarantee public safety in much of EL Alto. Additionally, the federation of parents of El Alto (FEDAPAF) has broken its dialogue w/ the minister of education. They’re demanding to speak w/ Evo regarding the 1,000 classrooms they were promised. Otherwise, they’ll begin a blockade of the city of El Alto.

Chávez is under criticism—even from MAS members—for some of his recent statements about Bolivia. During his visit to Cuba, Chávez stated that he would turn Bolivia into a “new Vietnam” if anything happened to Evo’s government, which was highly criticized as “interventionist” in many sectors (most notably, of course, the opposition). Some MAS members have joined in calls against Chávez’s statements, though government spokespeople were thankful for the Venezuelan president’s statements of “solidarity.”

A few days ago, a multiparty council came to a consensus on a model that would give department, municipal, indigenous, and “regional” (sub-department but larger than one municipality) autonomy. That consensus has now been rejected by indigenous community leaders (particularly those from CIDOB), leaders of department pro-autonomy movements, and the municipal governments represented in FAM (the Federation of Municipal Associations). That’s pretty much everyone, except the MAS leadership. Which leaves me wondering: Who supported this consensus? And did they ask anyone about it first? And will this quagmire ever end?

Ben Whitford (of Backyard Briefing) has a column in yesterday’s Guardian Unlimited: “The trouble with starting over.” In it, Whitford puts current attempts to draft new constitutions in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador into historical context. Such as the fact that Latin America has collectively gone through more than 200 constitutions since independence. It’s enough to makes one skeptical of the possibility of lasting change w/ such a long history of “disposable democracy.”

Today’s La Razón includes a supplement called “25 años de democracia.” It includes a number of essays on various topics related to Bolivia’s politics since democratization, including retrospectives written by Evo several ex-presidents: Rodríguez Veltzé, Mesa, Goni, Tuto, and Paz Zamora.

I just find this odd. There are two significant anniversaries coming up in Bolivia: the first is the 40th anniversary of the death of Che Guevara (who died in Bolivia), the second is the 25th anniversary of the end of military rule in Bolivia.

Friend & fellow Bolivian blogger, Eddie Avila has been busy w/ his Global Voices project in Bolivia. One of these is the first Aymara-language blog, a new expansion on the new Voces Bolivianas project. For news from this, and other “Rising Voices” projects, see this post

An article in today’s La Razón points out that Bolivia’s municipalities face a 23% drop in revenue transfers from the hydrocarbons tax. Bolivia’s central government collects this tax revenue. Under the 1994 Popular Participation law, the government then redistributes the revenue to municipal authorities. The government argues that because of the anticipated rise in tax revenues, municipal governments will still receive roughly the same amounts as last year. The government also argues that the money is being diverted to cover the expenses of the BONOSOL, the national pension plan created by first Sánchez de Lozada (Goni) administration. Municipal governments are complaining, of course, and several are preparing anti-government demonstrations.

This was just forwarded to me. It’s a short report from the Council on Hemispheric Affairs on the capital issue in Bolivia. It’s a good little primer on the issue.

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PS. A reader pointed me to a Notre Dame working paper on the moving of capital cities (see the comments below): Edward Schatz. 2003. “When Capital Cities Move: The Political Geography of Nation and State Building.” Kellogg Institute Working Paper #303, University of Notre Dame.

It’s still a few days away, but worth noting. This October 10th, Bolivia celebrates 25 years of democratic government. It falls one year short of the longest period of civilian (though not “democratic” by modern standards) rule in Bolivian history: 1904-1930.

On 10 October 1982, the last military head of state (Guido Vildoso Calderón) ceded power to civilian authorities. Rather than convene new elections under tense conditions, they respected the 1980 election results. The legislators elected in that election convened, naming Siles Zuazo president of Bolivia. At the head of a broad, but fractured, leftist coalition (the UDP), Siles Zuazo struggled to consolidate civilian-led democratic authority while managing a collapsing economy. In 1985, amid growing social unrest, he stepped down a year early in favor of the newly-elected Víctor Paz Estenssoro (of the MNR), who began the country’s transition away from a state-led development model (firmly in place since 1952) towards neoliberalism.

A quarter century later, Bolivia has come full circle. A president leads a broad, but fractured leftist coalition in the midst of social tension & a sluggish economy (though not yet near the “collapsing” point). I sincerely hope we can beat the 1904-1930 record.

Angus Reid Global Monitor just released new polling figures for Evo Morales. His public approval rating rebounded slightly in September to 59 percent, according to the latest survey. It’s unclear whether the figures include a “bump” after his visit to the United Nations last week or not. If it does, the bump (which is w/in the margin of error) was very small.

Here’s his figures since January 2006. It seems like his numbers have stabilized in the high 50s/low 60s range. The figures, of course, don’t show regional differences (Evo has retained high 80s/90s figures in La Paz-El Alto and low 30s/40s approval ratings in Santa Cruz).

The conflict over the location of Bolivia’s capital is still preventing the Constituent Assembly (frozen since August) from moving forward. A dialogue attempt, ongoing since last month, seems to have decidedly “broken” in favor of the government, w/ the assembly divided in two.

The decision by PODEMOS & four other parties (MNR-A3, APB, AAI, and MIR) to abandon dialogue, and return to Sucre (the seat of the constituent assembly) seems to have split the Assembly into two camps. Those remaining to dialogue include MAS & nine other parties (AYRA, AS, ASP, CN, MBL, MNR, MCSFA, MOP, and Unidad Nacional). The Tarija-based MNR-FRI still hasn’t decided. There are also a number of individual delegates who may have broken w/ their party or bloc.

A few notes of interest. Obviously (as the news reports make clear), the MAS-led bloc comprises more than two-thirds of the Assembly. This was the magic number needed to approve any new constitution. It’s unclear, however, whether the parties still in dialogue would vote together for a draft constitution. But MAS spokespersons were thrilled, arguing that they can no move forward on substantive issues. In essence, PODEMOS has boycotted the meetings in La Paz, and MAS is willing to ignore them.

The other interesting notice is which parties stayed behind in La Paz. While MNR-A3 (the Santa Cruz MNR bloc)—and probably also MNR-FRI (the Tarija MNR bloc)—went back to Sucre w/ PODEMOS, the rest of the MNR contingent has instead stayed in La Paz. Despite the “crisis” of the party, I believe the MNR is still playing an important pivot point in the constituent assembly process (for better or worse). After all, Evo’s government retains support in the Senate only by securing the support of Unidad Nacional & the MNR. Perhaps this isn’t surprising, since Evo’s government is essentially recreating the “1952 state” built by the MNR itself. While there are different strands w/in the party, its core ideological values have historically been integrationist nationalism & state-led economic development. I am keenly interested to see what role the MNR continues to play in all this.

The final interesting point is the potential for a new MAS attempt to dominate the proceeding. If the delegates in La Paz constitute a two-thirds supermajority, it’s likely that MAS will use this opportunity to draft a constitution w/o PODEMOS or the opposition (after all, MAS has already begun circulating complete draft proposals in the public press). On the one hand, MAS might have the votes. But on the other hand, the lack of any opposition in the proceedings would make the process somewhat questionable (to some more than to others, of course). How this plays out in the next few days may prove decisive.

I wasn’t entirely impressed w/ Evo’s performance on The Daily Show. From a PR point of view, he did well. He stuck to his talking points, he remained diplomatic, he was calm & eloquent. But it wasn’t funny.

If you haven’t already heard, Jon Stewart announced that Evo Morales will be on Comedy Central’s The Daily Show tonight (11pm EST). This is quite a coup for the show, which is fast becoming more of a “serious” news show than mainstream news (but does anyone think CNN, FOX, etc. are “serious” news networks anymore?). Needless to say, I’ll be tuning in.

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PS. Both The Daily Show & The Colbert Report have recently become the subject of a number of political science conference papers & journal articles.