We started Javi on solid foods a few days ago. It’s a little early, but he’s so big (he’s bigger than your average 8-month-old) that the pediatrician suggested we start him on solids now (adding that it was the reason he was demanding to eat so frequently). So we started him on wheat cereal, which he seemed to enjoy tremendously. Here’s some video:

A quick clarification in light of today’s argument that Bolivia’s political opposition suggests that a recall referendum may be unconstitutional: I don’t care.

Neither the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum nor the recall referendum are, strictly speaking, “constitutional.” The 2004 constitution allows for referendums (which can be initiated by the president, congress, or the public). This seems to imply that various kinds of referendums are possible. But the constitution doesn’t specifically prescribe how such referendums should be run.

This why I’ve (in previous posts & comments) distinguished between democratic institutionality & legality. I think both the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum (and the upcoming ones in Beni, Pando, and Tarija) was “institutionally democratic.” I also think a recall referendum could be, as well. The key is how it is managed. As far as anyone can tell, the Santa Cruz electoral court made a (mostly successful) concerted effort to get electoral materials distributed across the country, to register voters, to count the ballots properly—in short, to run a transparent, free, and fair electoral process. I see no reason why a national recall referendum couldn’t prove otherwise.

Of course, such a recall may not solve any problems. Evo will probably win (though I have some doubts), strengthening his claim to a mandate. But so will most of the prefects. So we’d end up at the same impasse.

So what do I mean by the distinction between “legality” vs. “democratic institutionality”? Well, not all laws are institutionally democratic. For an extreme example: There are elections in North Korea (legal practice enforced by the state), but they are hardly “democratic institutions.” Liberalism has long made the distinction between what is “lawful” & what is “right.” The US Declaration of Independence was hardly “legal” in the eyes of the Court of Saint James. Whether it was “democratic” is up for debate of course (did women get a vote? did slaves?), but it might serve as a historical example of a move many would consider “democratic” though “unlawful.”

I prefer to rely on objective criteria for democratic institutionality, such as Robert Dahl’s criteria (though these have been amended over the years):

1. Effective Participation. Citizens must have adequate and equal opportunities to form their preference and place questions on the public agenda and express reasons for one outcome over the other.
2. Voting Equality at the Decisive Stage. Each citizen must be assured his or her judgements will be counted as equal in weights to the judgements of others.
3. Enlightened Understanding. Citizens must enjoy ample and equal opportunities for discovering and affirming what choice would best serve their interests.
4. Control of the Agenda. Demos or people must have the opportunity to decide what political matters actually are and what should be brought up for deliberation.
5. Inclusiveness. Equality must extend to all citizens within the state. Everyone has legitimate stake within the political process.

What is remarkable is that, since 2003, Bolivia has been transitioning to a system of strict legal democracy (“partidocracia”) to something more participatory. The results is, understandably, chaotic. And some groups insist that only they have the right to represent “the people” (always a dangerous claim). And particularly in the context of efforts to “re-found” the nation (i.e. writing a new constitution), efforts should be made to stick to abstract first principles, rather than flowery (yet ineffective) legalese.

A surprising development in Bolivia: If Evo enacts a law approved by the Senate (as he said he would), there will be a recall referendum in Bolivia as early as August (90 days after the law is enacted). The recall referendum would put Evo & the country’s nine prefects up for an up or down popular vote of confidence.

Additionally, there’s a renewed push for reform of the National Electoral Court (CNE), from w/in the court’s ranks itself. Jerónimo Pinheiro, a member of the court, refused to sign a letter denouncing the Tarija, Beni, and Pando autonomy referendums (which are to be carried out by their respective regional electoral courts), and argued that the CNE (and its regional organs) is caught in the crossfire between the government & opposition. Such a move, of course, will only politicize the organ even more, since both government & opposition will seek to stack the court w/ its sympathizers.

There’s still hope for a democratic solution to the brewing crisis. It will, of course, depend on whether both sides—government & opposition—are willing to compromise, and if necessary, lose. Adam Przeworski once defined democracy as “a system in which parties lose elections” (meaning democrats must recognize that their side sometimes loses, and be willing to accept that). But Juan Linz also defined democracy as a “pro tempore regime” (meaning democratic decisions can never be permanently binding, they must always be reversible at some later date). Bolivian leaders will have to learn both lessons.

Human Rights Foundation (HRF) has posted its preliminary report on the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum.

They noted that the election was, on the whole, transparent, free, and fair. But they noted some sporadic violence meant primarily to intimidate voters—particularly by referendum opponents seeking to prevent voting. Most disconcerting was their observation that “police-issue tear gas” was used by anti-referendum groups in Montero, combined w/ a pronounced lack of police presence. Interestingly, they note that order was restored in Montero when children (9 to 14 years old) protected a polling station.

Increasingly, it will become harder to oppose the referendum on liberal democratic grounds (though its “legality” remains murky, of course). It’s becoming clear that the government is willing to use street violence to achieve its ends. That is dangerous.

It’s one thing for the state to use its police powers. The government could’ve called in the police to arrest regionalist leaders. Instead, it deliberately choose to instigate street violence (even shipping protesters in from other parts of the country). One of my greatest criticisms of the Evo government is its excessive reliance on para-state entities (Ponchos Rojos & other organized grupos de choque—and, yes, I know the opposition has some of its own grupos de choque, but that doesn’t make it right, does it?) to enforce its political will. If the state can’t (or won’t?) use the police & courts (and do so both legally & democratically), it should re-evaluate whether it's “revolution” is democratic or not. And once a state eskews institutional means for street violence, it essentially accepts that whoever can bring the most violence to bear wins—historically a recipe for disaster (especially for left-leaning governments).

Although vice president Alvaro Garcia Linera gave a keynote address at last year’s LASA conference that sent chills down many people’s spines when he (w/ a cold smile on his face) dared the opposition to make the government “take that next step ...” As a former guerrilla, perhaps he relishes the thought of armed confrontation. After all, he was too young to take up arms in the 1970s (as many idealistic leftists did), forcing him to take up arms against the Bolivian state in the 1990s (when Bolivia was governed by a former leftist guerrilla w/ a disfigured face from a botched assassination attempt & who’s brother had died fighting the Banzer regime). But history, of course, is richly ironic.

I just took up the FP Passport challenge & wrote in Stephen Colbert for its list of the top 20 “Public Intellectuals.” My other votes were for: Fareed Zakaria, Ian Buruma, Amartya Sen, Vaclav Havel, and Robert Kagan.

PS: Kagan has a new book coming out any week now; there’s a preview essay (“The End of the End of History”) in the last New Republic.

While all attention is currently on Santa Cruz, it’s important to look ahead to June 22. That’s when Tarija will hold its autonomy referendum (making it the 4th department to hold such a vote). Santa Cruz leaders will wait until then to negotiate collectively w/ the central government.

Meanwhile, an interesting preview of what an “autonomous” Santa Cruz might look like: The agenda includes a move towards universal health care, an increase in the minimum salary, and a distribution of the region’s income favoring “productive” areas. This last one is interesting (not that the others aren’t). The proposed formula would mean that 50% of spending would go to “productive” provinces, with the remainder going to non-productive provinces (40%) and indigenous communities (10%). If enacted, this would mean that oil & gas producing regions (like Camiri) would retain most of their income (rather than sending it to either La Paz or Santa Cruz). But it also means that regions that produce more economic growth would also share half of that growth with poorer (“less productive”) parts of the Santa Cruz department.

Such moves make it harder to sustain the argument that this is merely an “oligarchic” or “reactionary” plan, rather than a much-needed devolution of state powers (ironically, in the 1990s Bolivia was a pioneer in decentralization; today it is one of the most centralized countries in the region, having been surpassed by most of its neighbors).

It’s also interesting to note that Juan Del Granado (the mayor of La Paz & an important Evo ally) publicly recognized the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum as a “legitimate” expression of popular sentiment. Clearly, the momentum has shifted away from Evo in the past few days. How permanent that shift is remains to be seen.

The Santa Cruz departmental electoral court (CDE) website has updated official counts, as they’re processed. They’re using the same software/process (SIRENA) as the national electoral court (CNE)—which is the software/process used by each of the regional electoral courts during national elections.

So far, w/ 55.6% of the tables counted, the results show 85.61% in favor of the autonomy statute, 14.93% opposed. Those figures are over “valid” votes (spoiled or blank ballots are counted as “invalid”—as in all Bolivian elections). Of total cast votes (votos emitidos), so far 1.39% are blank & 2.33% are spoiled. Voter turnout is currently 65.57%.

If you click on this link, you can look at results by province, municipality, canton, locality, neighborhood unit (unidad vecinal), precinct (recinto), and table (mesa de sufragio). For example: Votes in Samaipata (in the first municipal section of Florida province) are not yet counted. While in Pailón (in the second municipal section of Chuquitos province) the results currently favor autonomy by 88.24% to 11.76% w/ 96% of the tables counted (one table remains to be counted).

The official count will be made public by Friday. But this morning’s reports show that “Sí” (pro autonomy) won by 86% to 14% in yesterday’s Santa Cruz autonomy referendum. It seems unlikely that these figures will change significantly. Some brief analysis:

The vote is a significant increase from the July 2006 vote, in which a similar referendum won 71% approval from voters. But it also had a much higher absenteeism than in 2006 (from 17% to 39%, slightly more than double). Mathematically, of course, it wouldn’t have affected the outcome.¹ This does show, however, that the most of the abstentions were from potential “No” voters.

How legitimate is a vote w/ only 61% voter turnout? Clearly, it’s acceptable in the US context (where 61% would be considered very good). But what matters here is the Bolivian context. In the December 2005 general election, the national turnout was 84.5%, w/ 86.7% turnout in La Paz & 81.6% in Santa Cruz. But that year was a high turnout year nation-wide, and one in which Santa Cruz (which usually had one of the highest turnouts in the country) had an exceptionally low turnout.

Clearly, 61% turnout is not stellar. Evo points to this as sign that the referendum failed. But considering highly concerted efforts by the government & its sympathizers to disrupt the process, the lack of police protection, and an organized electoral boycott, 61% is not an incredibly low figure, either. Many in Santa Cruz began celebrating last night. They were joined by celebrations in Sucre, Tarija, and other parts of the country.

Everyone recognizes that a negotiation will now ensue. Santa Cruz leaders will have to be flexible w/ their autonomy statute; Evo & his supporters will have to be flexible as well. At this point, it seems obvious that any political solution to the conflict brewing in Bolivia since January 2004 (when the first pro-autonomy protests began) will have to recognize some degree of political devolution to the country’s regions. Bolivia will no doubt begin to follow Spain’s path, which granted special autonomic status to regions like Catalonia since 1978. It’s perhaps not surprising that several regionalist leaders (particularly in Tarija) have had Catalan advisors for some time.

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¹ If you do the math, dividing the number of votes cast for “Sí” (569,324) over the total number of registered voters (935,959), the figure is 61%.

PS. The New York Times has a story by Simon Romero that includes some quotes from me.

The official results aren’t in yet. But El Deber (and other media) reports that the “Sí” vote won in the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum—by a wide margin (exit polling has it 85.3% to 14.7% in the city, 89.6% to 10.4% in the rural areas).

Even as I typed this, MABB posted results (and a television screenshot) showing a landslide “Sí” victory (85.1% to 14.9%).

No doubt the pro-MAS (and anti-autonomy) boycott—which was most effective in rural areas like San Julian & Yapacaní—brought down the potential “No” votes (in 2006, “No” took nearly 30%). But the result was never in doubt. It was only a question of whether the results would be “legitimate” or not.

For its part, I don’t think Evo or MAS won this round. Despite some sporadic violence by pro-MAS groups, the election went relatively smoothly in most parts of the department. The department leaders demonstrated that they’re able to carry out a regional referendum, both despite the central government’s objections & w/o its institutional support (some might even say, despite it’s deliberate attempt to disrupt the process). International & domestic observers are likely to verify the results, making it harder to press for a claim of “illegitimacy.”

On the other hand, the margin of victory for Santa Cruz will now depend on a number of factors:

How high was voter absenteeism? If it’s too much higher than 30% (voter abstention in the 2005 was about 20%; I don’t have the figures for 2006), it will weaken the regional leaders’ claim for a mandate. But it won’t change the fact that a majority support some measure of regional autonomy. Even a 40% abstention rate, assuming all of those voters would’ve voted “No” would still leave a solid majority for “Sí” (51%).

How much violence is acceptable? With at least one dead & about 40 injured, a claim can be made that this wasn’t a smooth election. On the other hand, there was considerably less violence than many predicted (and much less than in previous clashes in Sucre, Cochabamba, and elsewhere).

How does Evo respond? That is the million dollar question. Santa Cruz has essentially shown that a considerable majority of its population wants regional autonomy. It’s now up to the government to respond w/ a counter-proposal that would incorporate regional autonomy into a constitutional framework. This is essentially where we were in 2006 (when 71% of Santa Cruz voted for autonomy). But now the government’s bargaining position is weaker: it tried to prevent or disrupt the referendum, and failed to do so. The two options now seem to be: a) accept the results & move to compromise or b) dismiss the results as irrelevant & risk further confrontation.

The longer the issue simmers—particularly in this polarized climate—the further away a compromise will be. And the more likely the region will drift closer to secession.

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PS. You can read some (less than stellar) quotes of mine in this Voice of America story on the referendum. The other interviewee was Raul Madrid (University of Texas at Austin).

Today’s Santa Cruz autonomy referendum is under way. There won’t be much news until later, of course. But the morning news highlighted problems in Yapacaní & San Julian.

In Yapacaní, MAS supporters attacked a number of pro-autonomy installations, including private residences w/ “Sí” propaganda (a few entered at least one house, and threatened the woman who lived there). A photojournalist from La Razón was attacked; another from El Deber was threatened. The police, 200 meters away (according to reports), did nothing.

In San Julian, things are more calm, but MAS supporters made clear their plan to burn all the ballot boxes in the area. Residents of the Los Ángeles neighborhood protested the decision to not allow their school (built by their own labor) to be used as a polling place. The neighbors then offered their guarantee of protection for the local election officials, who moved their headquarters there.

When local officials asked the police to come to prevent violence on election day, the police refused, since they had not been sent to the area to guard ballot boxes. (A large police reinforcement was sent by the government to Santa Cruz in anticipation of the referendum.)

The rest of the department seems calm. About a million residents are registered to vote. Department officials have vowed to punish anyone who disrupts the electoral process, but also urges calm during the day. We’ll see what happens.

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Also check out MABB, currently in Santa Cruz. He reports that television shows an armed group of 30-40 being driven around Yapacaní, specifically targeting polling places & referendum election officials.

Global Voices Bolivia also has a very good roundup of Bolivia bloggers’ reactions.

On a personal note: a story about K8’s research got digged. If you wondered what her NSF research was about, or why she drives to Delaware every week, now you know.

Tomorrow, Santa Cruz goes to the polls in its autonomy referendum. The central government is still adamantly opposed, of course. On the eve of the election, it’s also clear that there is little that can be done to stop it. But what will happen?

The report from the OAS (Organization of American States) that Evo hoped would condemn the referendum only expressed its support for Bolivia’s national integrity & democratic institutions; it didn’t explicitly condemn the autonomy referendum (it didn’t even mention the referendum in the resolution’s text).

The armed forces declared its support for Evo’s government & their opposition to the Santa Cruz referendum (which it called “illegal”). Nevertheless, the military explicitly cautioned against using force except if the situation “escalated.” All the while, rumors of coups are starting to circulate (yet again). At the same time, the national police force in Santa Cruz now reaches 4,200 (w/ future reinforcements on standby in Oruro and La Paz). Their orders are to help keep the peace, not to protect the election process.

Santa Cruz was one of the first (and still one of only a few) to have its own municipal police force (guardia municipal). 950 members of the guardia (I don’t know what the total number is) are distributing the ballots & ballot boxes throughout the department. Along with “civic brigades” (such as the UJC & Nación Camba youth groups & other volunteers), the guardia will play the role of police during the election process (typically, the national police has a presence during election day to help ensure the process).

In a show of regional solidarity, election monitors are arriving from Beni, Pando, and Tarija (including members of their respective departmental electoral courts). Additionally, Tarija & Beni had earlier sent some of their own civic brigades to reinforce Santa Cruz (in expectation that Santa Cruz would reciprocate when it came time for their own autonomy referendums). Human Rights Watch is sending monitors, too.

What would count as a victory?

For MAS, which has stated it will seek to burn ballot boxes & otherwise disrupt the autonomy referendum, a victory involves either a large enough boycott (or other disruption) that call into question the validity of the vote or significant levels of violence or both. There is little doubt that Santa Cruz will vote for autonomy (in 2006, in a similar nation-wide referendum the department voted 71% for autonomy). So MAS will seek to discredit the vote, by any means.

For the autonomy movement, a victory will require an election process that is as smooth, peaceful, and transparent as possible. There will be a temptation to “defend” the process against MAS agitators (most of whom are coming from far away Cochabamba, La Paz, and Oruro). To do so would only backfire. Any violence would most likely cast a dark cloud over the referendum process—unless the violence was clearly one-sided & almost all the blame could be cast on MAS agitators.

Hence, a pr war will likely ensue to control the images on television, as well as to frame the event. Santa Cruz private television will support the regional movement; state-owned television will show violence & criticize of the event.

A bit of history (& theory)

It’s important to note that Santa Cruz has a long history as a “rebellious” region of the country. W/o romanticizing, throughout Bolivia’s history, Santa Cruz has periodically risen up against the central government.

After independence, Santa Cruz & Moxos (Beni) were forced into the new Bolivian state by Sucre in 1826. A “federalist” declaration of 1876 was put down. Santa Cruz elites also joined w/ La Paz liberals in the 1899 Federalist War. Once victorious, the La Paz liberals merely moved the capital from Sucre to La Paz, maintaining a centralized government. There were two chief ironies of the war’s conclusion: first, indigenous forces (under Zárate Willka) that had supported the liberals were massacred; second, the Santa Cruz federalists were also put down.

There were regionalist flare-ups in the 1930s. Santa Cruz also played a key role in the “national revolution” process. In the 1949 uprising (a “dress rehearsal” for the 1952 Revolution), Santa Cruz served as the MNR’s provisional capital & held out for nearly two months against the military. And both during the first Siles Zuazo government (1956-1960) & the Barrientos dictatorship, Santa Cruz was occupied by campesino militias. Many considered the Banzer regime an essentially “Santa Cruz” regime (Banzer was from Santa Cruz, but more importantly his coup was launched there).

This is the history that Santa Cruz regional leaders point to (and cite in the autonomy statute’s preamble). It’s a constructed history, of course, as all histories are socially constructed narratives (ask Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, or Eric Hobsbawm). And it’s important to note that Santa Cruz has, in the past two decades, seen a revival of “regional” cultural history. It’s evident in the new momuments across the city erected to regional (not national) heroes, in the folkloric festivals, and in a resurgence of camba dialect in public sphere (you know you’re watching Telepaís because the anchors “speak camba”). Cultural production is important in the forging of a political community.

But this is also part of a broader process of globalization. Nearly two decades ago Benjamin Barber warned that the world’s nation-states were being pulled apart by the forces of “McWorld” (global integration) & “Jihad” (regional, ethnic, or religious fragmentation). Bolivia is a prime example. Bolivia’s entrance into the neoliberal economy put strain on a centralized state—particularly one that still relies on the myths of the 1952 National Revolution (and it’s homogenous mestizo nationalism). On the one hand, Bolivia is pushed to integrate into global organizations (Mercosur, ALBA, FTA) that supercede the central state’s traditional functions. On the other hand, regional/ethnic communities (whether Aymara indigenous movements or Santa Cruz regionalists) challenge the central state’s legitimacy.

The challenge for Bolivia—as it is for all multiethnic states—is to find a way to balance state authority w/ recognition of its plural community. But that plural community can’t be identified as merely “ethnic” in a simplified way. The “losers” of Bolivian centralism haven’t only been the country’s indigenous people. Regions like Santa Cruz or Tarija see a need for historical vindications, too. And whether we may agree or disagree on the objective quality of those calls vindication, the groups making them believe them to be true.

Also ... MABB is currently back in Bolivia, posting up a storm. Be sure to check him out, too. (Especially for info on the May 1st decrees.)

Boz beat me to the latest poll numbers out of Bolivia: Evo retains 54% public approval (down from 56% in March) across Bolivia, according to the latest poll.

The regional breakdown is again interesting. Evo’s approval is 85% in El Alto, 75% in the city of La Paz, 48% in the city of Cochabamba, and 25% in the city of Santa Cruz. As usual, the Apoyo, Opinión y Mercado polls sample only urban residents. So caveats must be made: Evo’s support is (probably) higher in rural areas than in urban areas. Though these four urban spaces include nearly two thirds of the entire country’s population.

Nevertheless, the most important thing about public approval polls is not the number itself—but rather their trajectory. Since taking office, Evo’s approval has steadily declined to hover in the mid-50s range. Additionally, the regional polarization has sharpened. More interestingly, Evo’s approval in Cochabamba has dipped below 50% recently, which puts the department at risk of moving into the regionalist opposition (which now includes the departments of Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, Pando, and Chuquisaca). Most surprising, however, is that Evo’s approval in El Alto is also starting to erode (his numbers there were regularly in the 90s), though his still-high approval there means that the El Alto street is still his strongest constituency (of the urban ones).

The polls also included figures for the vice president, Alvaro García Linera. He currently stands at 47% nationwide approval, w/ 76% in El Alto, 68% in La Paz, 41% in Cochabamba, and 20% in Santa Cruz. Approval for the government now stands at 48%, a steady decline from 54% in January.

One final note should be made about public approval figures: They should not be confused w/ intention to vote for or against incumbents. In many cases, voters may give incumbents low approval ratings, but vote for them again—depending on the alternatives & circumstances. Other times, voters may give incumbents high approval ratings, but them vote for rivals—again, depending on alternatives & circumstances.

In other polling news: Mercado, Opinión y Mercado also released a poll of support for the Santa Cruz autonomy referendum (still going forward May 4). 74% of Santa Cruz residents favor the new referendum statute, 13% are opposed, and 13% aren’t sure. The pollsters included autonomy referendum questions in their other samples. Again, we see regional polarization: only 27% of La Paz & El Alto residents would vote for regional autonomy, while 44% of those in Cochabamba said they would. More and more the country is dividing too neatly into “occidente” (Andean highlands) & “media luna” (eastern lowlands), w/ Cochabamba becoming the balance point. Where Cochabamba ends up tipping towards will likely decide everything.